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To Protect Freedom of Expression,
Why Not Steal Victory from the
Jaws of Defeat?
Evelyn Mary Aswad*
Abstract
Global social media platforms are grappling with whether
to align their corporate speech codes with international human
rights law. Facebook’s June 2019 report that summarized
worldwide feedback about its proposed independent oversight
board for content moderation noted a split in stakeholder
opinions on this topic. The UN’s top expert on freedom of
expression as well as many civil society members recommended
that Facebook anchor its content moderation in the
international human rights law regime. Others expressed
concern that this legal regime would not be sufficiently
protective of speech and contained inconsistencies that create
problems for content moderation.
Those concerns were linked to a recent scholarly call for
updates to the UN’s international legal regime regarding
* The author is the Herman G. Kaiser Chair in International Law and
the Director of the Center for International Business & Human Rights at the
University of Oklahoma’s College of Law. Previously, she was the director of
the human rights law office at the U.S. Department of State (2010–2013) and
served as an attorney-adviser in that human rights law office from
2004– 2009. The author wishes to thank Stanford University’s Global Digital
Policy Incubator for inviting her to participate in a variety of events in which
issues at the intersection of content moderation and international human
rights law were discussed, which helped with her analysis of the issues in
this Article. The author also wishes to thank her research assistant, Bailey
Betz, for his excellent assistance with this Article. The views are solely those
of the author.
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freedom of expression, particularly with respect to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination. This Article examines the scholarly call’s
analysis to assess whether its conclusions are correct, which
would make this body of law less useful for platforms to adopt
in content moderation.
This Article finds that the state of international law on
freedom of expression is more protective of speech (and more
coherent) than the scholars assessed and proposes ways to
achieve their laudable goal of promoting broad protections for
freedom of expression in international law. The Article
concludes that the existing international legal regime on
freedom of expression remains a useful resource for content
moderation by global platforms.
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I. Introduction
In the midst of controversy regarding how global social
media platforms curate user-generated content,1 these
companies are considering whether they should align their
speech codes for online content with international law
standards on expression. For example, in June 2019, Facebook
released a report that summarized worldwide feedback on its
proposed independent oversight board, which will review some
of the platform’s content moderation decisions.2 The Facebook
1. See, e.g., Cat Zakrzewski, The Technology 202: Lawmakers Plan to
Ratchet Up Pressure on Tech Companies’ Content Moderation Practices,
WASH. POST (Apr. 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/K7CX-BHXX (discussing a variety of
criticisms of platform content moderation with respect to potentially harmful and
offensive speech) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

2. See FACEBOOK, GLOBAL FEEDBACK & INPUT ON THE FACEBOOK
OVERSIGHT
BOARD
FOR
CONTENT
DECISIONS
10–37
(2019),
https://perma.cc/2W84-6XAX (PDF) [hereinafter FACEBOOK REPORT]
(summarizing views of external stakeholders on a variety of aspects of the
proposed oversight board). In November 2018, Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg proposed the establishment of an independent body that would
assess speech issues on the company’s platform. Id. at 4. Harvard Law
School Professor Noah Feldman had initially proposed the idea of a Facebook
“Supreme Court” to ensure an “independent decision-making process based
on a formal commitment to freedom of expression” to adjudicate speech
issues arising from content generated by the billions of individuals who use
the platform. Id. at 8. In January 2019, Facebook issued a proposed charter
for the new body (the “Oversight Board”) and conducted six months of
consultations throughout the world to receive feedback. Id. at 4–5. The
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report notes that the United Nations’ (UN) top expert for
freedom of expression and members of civil society,3 including
myself,4 advocated for use of international human rights law’s
free expression protections in the Oversight Board’s review of
the company’s global content moderation decisions.5 These
stakeholders generally linked their views to the UN Guiding
Principles for Business & Human Rights6 (UNGPs), a
framework that sets forth the international community’s
expectations for corporations when their operations intersect
with human rights issues.7 Under the UNGPs, companies are

Oversight Board’s mandate will cover content decisions made by the
company under its corporate speech code (i.e., the Community Standards)
and not content removals based on compliance with local laws. Id. at 35.
3. See id. at 34 (discussing external stakeholder support for Facebook
to adopt UN human rights standards in content moderation). Civil society
groups have also called for the creation of “social media councils” that would
provide independent oversight over the content moderation of all platforms.
See id. at 8 (“[An NGO called] Article 19 has proposed establishing a
multi-stakeholder and industry-wide “Social Media Council,” which shares
some similarities with the Oversight Board proposed by Facebook.”);
STANFORD GLOBAL DIGITAL POLICY INCUBATOR, ARTICLE 19, & UNITED NATIONS
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION, SOCIAL MEDIA
COUNCILS: FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY 10 (2019), https://perma.cc/X2CGQZYQ (PDF) (endorsing the creation of social media councils grounded in
international human rights law principles for freedom of expression). On
September 17, 2019, Facebook released the charter for its Oversight Board,
which states that “the board will pay particular attention to the impact of
removing content in light of human rights norms protecting free expression.”
FACEBOOK, OVERSIGHT BOARD CHARTER 5 (2019), https://perma.cc/5J3L-THD7
(PDF). It remains to be seen how Facebook’s Oversight Board will interpret
this mandate and if other platforms will seek to align their content
moderation with international human rights standards.
4. See FACEBOOK REPORT, supra note 2, at 43 nn. 250 & 257 (citing
Evelyn Mary Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE
L. & TECH. REV. 26 (2018)).
5. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
6. John Ruggie, Rep. of the Special Representative of the Sec’y-Gen. on
the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corps. and Other Bus.
Enters., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UNGPs].
7. See Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4, at
2 (July 6, 2011) (endorsing “the Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’
Framework”); see generally UNGPs, supra note 6 (introducing and explaining
the UN Guiding Principles).
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expected to “respect” the human rights in key UN instruments8
in their business operations, which means they “should avoid
infringing on the human rights of others” and “should address
adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”9
Facebook’s report, however, noted that other stakeholders
raised concerns about anchoring content moderation to
international human rights law.10 For example, one
stakeholder expressed concerns that human rights law could
affect how Facebook “balances users’ security and trust against
freedom of expression.”11 The concerns included whether
international human rights law might be too protective of
speech and thus limit Facebook’s ability to remove speech that
offends individuals and advertisers who use the platform.12 On
8. Principle 12 of the UNGPs calls on business enterprises to respect
“international human rights” that are defined to include the International
Bill of Human Rights (i.e., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) as well as the principles
concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labor
Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,
UNGPs, supra note 6, at 13. The official commentary to Principle 12 states
that businesses may also need to refer to additional UN human rights
instruments. Id. at 13–14.
9. Id. at 13. The U.S. government has endorsed the UNGPs and
encouraged their implementation by American companies. U.S. Dep’t of
State, Bureau of Democracy, H. R. and Lab., U.S. Government Approach on
Business and Human Rights 4 (2013), https://perma.cc/BTN8-YWEY (stating
the U.S. government’s position that the UNGPs should serve “as a ‘floor’
rather than a ‘ceiling’ for addressing issues of business and human rights”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); U.S. GOVERNMENT,
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT: FIRST NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (2016), https://perma.cc/Q95N-FQ8Q (PDF)
(encouraging businesses to use “the UN Guiding Principles as a floor rather
than a ceiling for implementing responsible business practices”).
10. See FACEBOOK REPORT, supra note 2, at 34 (noting that other
stakeholders “felt that focusing exclusively on a human rights framework
would not be enough to adjudicate hard cases”).
11. Id.
12. See FACEBOOK, GLOBAL FEEDBACK AND INPUT ON THE FACEBOOK
OVERSIGHT BOARD FOR CONTENT DECISIONS: APPENDIX 123–24 (2019),
https://perma.cc/6YT9-UGSW (PDF) (noting concerns of external
stakeholders that adherence to international free expression standards
would require Facebook to protect speech that it otherwise would remove
from its platform under existing rules and policies).
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the other hand, another stakeholder cautioned that social
media companies may not be well-served by anchoring their
private speech codes to existing international human rights
law principles because of concerns that this body of law
contains conflicting norms and may insufficiently protect
speech.13 In articulating these concerns, this stakeholder cited
a 2017 article titled The Right to Insult in International Law.14
In that article, the authors eloquently present their vision
for broad protections for freedom of expression under
international law and call for revisions to the regime.15 After
an excellent survey of domestic laws from around the world
that fail to protect the “right to insult” rulers, religion, or
royalty,16 the article examines international standards and
contends that they not only fail to afford insults sufficient
protection, but also provide inconsistent guidance on

13. See FACEBOOK REPORT, supra note 2, at 34–35 (stating that others
took the position that the international “human rights law [regime] is not ‘a
single, self-contained and cohesive body of rules.’ . . . ‘[T]hese laws are found
in a variety of international and regional treaties that are subject to differing
interpretations by states that are parties to the convention as well as
international tribunals that apply the laws.” (quoting Evelyn Douek, U.N.
Special Rapporteur’s Latest Report on Online Content Regulation Calls for
‘Human Rights by Default,’ LAWFARE BLOG (June 6, 2018, 8:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/2FZU-4H5T (last visited Mar. 18, 2020) (noting as well that
some commentators are concerned that international freedom of expression
standards may not protect speech enough) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
14. Amal Clooney & Philippa Webb, The Right to Insult in International
Law, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2017).
15. See id. at 47–51 (calling for a revised international law approach to
speech that is inspired by the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment); see also
Alan Wehbé, Increasing International Legal Protection for Freedom of
Expression, 8 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. 44, 59 (2018) (arguing for a
new treaty on freedom of expression because of concerns that the current
regime is not sufficiently protective of speech and not effective in changing
problematic governmental approaches to speech).
16. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 3–13 (discussing domestic
laws that use criminal defamation, sedition, hate speech, “fake” news, and
public order as a justification to quash criticism of rulers; criminal
blasphemy as well as laws protecting religious feelings to prevent insults to
religions; and criminal bans on exhibiting disrespect for royalty).
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permissible restrictions for such offensive speech.17 To achieve
broader speech protections, the authors recommend several
approaches at the international level.18 For example, they call
on states to seek amendments to existing treaty text or enter
reservations to particular treaty provisions,19 with the
ultimate goal of nudging international law closer to U.S. First
Amendment protections for speech.20 The authors conclude by
recommending that social media companies respect the
international human rights law regime in assessing speech
issues on their platforms, but that they do so by incorporating
the authors’ proposed updates to the regime.21
While I share the authors’ laudable goal of promoting the
broadest possible international protections for freedom of
expression, I write this Article to advance the proposition that
the state of international law on the ability of individuals to
insult or otherwise engage in offensive speech is not bleak, as
portrayed in their article, but rather this body of law contains
robust and principled speech protections.22 This Article also
notes that a number of the authors’ recommended solutions
may not be necessary or feasible, proposes more fruitful ways
forward in achieving their laudable goal, and defends the

17. See id. at 37 (“[T]he right to insult is not sufficiently protected under
international law . . . . [I]nternational standards have proved to be
confusing . . . .”).
18. See infra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
19. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 53–54 (calling for deletion of
Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and
for states to opt out of Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights).
20. See id. at 51 (“We believe that international law on insulting speech
should be applied in a manner that is . . . more protective of speech, in line
with the approach espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court under the First
Amendment.”).
21. See id. at 54 (advocating that their proposed revisions to the
international human rights law regime on expression “should also guide the
private sector when they are requested to remove online content because it is
considered insulting by a person, institution, or government”).
22. Compare infra Part II, with Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at
37–51 (describing the current speech regime in international law and
criticizing its inefficacy).
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utility of the existing international legal regime in content
moderation by private platforms.23
Part II of this Article explains why the current state of
international law affords more robust protections for insulting
speech than Clooney and Webb claim as well as why
international standards are generally consistent on this topic.
Part III evaluates the authors’ recommendations for action at
the international level and finds they may not reflect the best
way to achieve the authors’ important goal. Part III also
proposes that the most fruitful path for protecting the ability of
individuals to engage in insulting or otherwise offensive speech
(and, more generally, to promote broad free expression
protections) involves seizing victory from the jaws of defeat by
invoking and promoting existing UN treaty texts and positive
interpretations from the UN human rights machinery on
freedom of expression. Part IV concludes by reaffirming the
utility of this body of international law as a key resource in
global corporate content moderation.
II. The Current State of International Law on Insults or
Otherwise Offensive Speech
The authors of The Right to Insult in International Law
highlight that the key international human rights treaty
provisions involving freedom of expression are Articles 19 and
20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights24
(ICCPR) as well as Article 4 of the Convention on Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination25 (CERD).26 The authors
conclude that these provisions provide insufficient protection

23. See infra Parts II, III, IV.
24. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 19, 20, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
25. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, art. 4, S. Exec. Doc. C,
95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 218 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)
[hereinafter CERD].
26. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 15–19 (discussing
international law’s protections for expression as well as its mandatory bans
on hateful speech).
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for insulting speech27 and that the interpretative guidance
with respect to these provisions is conflicting.28 However, their
overview of these treaty provisions did not include an analysis
of ICCPR Article 19’s rigorous tripartite test for speech
restrictions or a number of key interpretations issued by the
UN human rights bodies charged with monitoring
implementation of those treaties.29 ICCPR Article 19’s
tripartite test, buttressed by the UN machinery’s
recommended interpretations, places a substantial legal
limitation on the discretion of states to restrict speech,
particularly on the topic of insults to rulers, religion, and
royalty.30
Part II.A discusses how ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test
helps achieve the authors’ goal of promoting broad protections
for expression, including insulting or otherwise offensive
speech. Part II.B explains why it is inappropriate to conflate
interpretations of the UN’s international human rights
machinery with those issued by regional bodies in order to
conclude that the UN’s international law standards are
inconsistent. In addition, Part II.B demonstrates that the cited
inconsistences within the UN watchdogs’ interpretations of
freedom of expression are more suitably attributed to an
evolution in the thinking of these bodies over time rather than
unworkable inconsistencies.

27. See, e.g., id. at 16 (asserting that the relevant human rights law
treaty provisions “allow insulting speech to be silenced if it constitutes
discriminatory ‘hate speech’ targeting minorities on the basis of race,
nationality or religion even if there is no criminal intent or risk that it will
lead to violence”); id. at 38 (concluding that ICCPR Article 20(2) and CERD
Article 4 mandate overly broad restrictions on speech).
28. See id. at 44–47 (outlining the inconsistencies between the UN
human rights machinery and regional human rights mechanisms).
29. See id. at 15–21 (discussing the history and a textual analysis of
ICCPR Articles 19 and 20 as well as CERD Article 4). Similarly, another
scholar who recently called for updates to the international legal regime on
freedom of expression concluded that the existing regime was insufficiently
protective of speech without analyzing or discussing ICCPR Article 19’s
tripartite test for speech restrictions. Wehbé, supra note 15, at 50–53.
30. See Evelyn M. Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online,
17 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 26, 35–37 (2018) (introducing, defining, and
discussing the mechanics of the ICCPR Article 19 tripartite test).
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A. ICCPR Article 19’s Tripartite Test and Its Impact on Bans
on Insulting or Offensive Speech
ICCPR Article 19(2) provides broad protections for speech
by declaring an expansive right to seek and receive
information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers and through
any media.31 However, the article’s next clause permits, but
does not require, State Parties to limit speech when each part
of a tripartite test is met.32 To be valid, speech restrictions
must be (1) “provided by law” and (2) “necessary” to (3) achieve
one of the treaty’s stated public interest objectives.33 These
three prongs are often referred to as the “cumulative
conditions of legality, necessity, and legitimacy.”34
In 2011, the UN Human Rights Committee, the body of
independent experts elected by ICCPR State Parties to
monitor implementation of the treaty, recommended
interpretations of this article that broadly protect speech
rights.35 According to the Committee, a government must
prove that any limitation on expression, including insulting
speech, meets Article 19’s tripartite test.36 The remainder of
31. See ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 19(2) (“Everyone shall have the
right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of his choice.”).
32. See id. art. 19(3).
33. See id. (listing the public interest objectives as the protection of the
rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, public health
or morals).
34. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018)
[hereinafter UN SR 2018 Report].
35. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 34, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter GC 34] (discussing the
scope of freedom of expression and forbidding the adoption of overly broad
speech restrictions).
36. See id. ¶ 27 (“It is for the State party to demonstrate the legal basis
for any restrictions imposed on freedom of expression. If, with regard to a
particular State party, the Committee has to consider whether a particular
restriction is imposed by law, the State party should provide details of the
law and of actions that fall within the scope of the law.”); see also id. ¶ 35
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Part II.A elaborates on Article 19(3)’s tripartite test, highlights
key interpretations by the UN human rights machinery, and
explains how these three conditions promote broad protections
for expression that are in line with the authors’ vision of
protecting insulting speech.
1. The “Legality” Condition: A Prohibition on Vague Content
Bans
The first prong of the tripartite test, the “provided by law”
or “legality” condition, is generally understood to mean, inter
alia, that laws limiting speech must be properly promulgated
and not vague.37 The UN Human Rights Committee has
emphasized that legal restrictions on speech must give
individuals sufficient notice of the parameters of unacceptable
expression.38 The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
(the “UN Special Rapporteur”), an independent expert
appointed by the UN Human Rights Council to examine and
report on this right, has also emphasized this point.39 In this
When a State party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of
freedom of expression, it must demonstrate in specific and
individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, and the
necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in
particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection
between the expression and the threat.
37. See infra notes 38–41 and accompanying text.
38. See GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 25
[A] norm, to be characterized as a ‘law’, must be formulated with
sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her
conduct accordingly and it must be made accessible to the public.
A law may not confer unfettered discretion for the restriction of
freedom of expression on those charged with its execution. Laws
must provide sufficient guidance to those charged with their
execution to enable them to ascertain what sorts of expression are
properly restricted and what sorts are not.
Similarly, the United States government interprets the legality condition as
encompassing “laws that are accessible, clear, and subject to judicial
scrutiny,” OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 226–27 (2011) [hereinafter
U.S. OBSERVATIONS].
39. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 7 (noting the legality
condition means legal restrictions “must be adopted by regular legal
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regard, he has criticized many national laws as unduly vague,
including those that ban “obscene, gory or offensive material
which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the general public” or
the “glorification of terrorism.”40 In his report recommending
that social media companies align their speech codes with
ICCPR Article 19, the UN Special Rapporteur also criticized
these private sector codes for incorporating a variety of vague
bans on insulting or offensive speech.41
As a former President of the American Civil Liberties
Union discusses in her recent book on hate speech, prohibiting
vague wording in speech bans plays an important role in
limiting governmental regulation of offensive speech such as
insults.42 In examining U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, she
recounts that the Court has repeatedly struck down laws
banning “insulting,” “abusive,” and other such language on
processes and limit government discretion in a manner that distinguishes
between lawful and unlawful expression with ‘sufficient precision’”).
40. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/71/373 (Sept. 6, 2016)
[hereinafter UN SR 2016 Report]. The UN Human Rights Committee has
also expressed concern about vague phrasing in counter-terrorism laws. See
GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 46 (“Such offences as ‘encouragement of terrorism’
and ‘extremist activity’ as well as offences of ‘praising’, ‘glorifying’, or
‘justifying’ terrorism, should be clearly defined to ensure that they do not
lead to unnecessary or disproportionate interference with freedom of
expression.”). The Special Rapporteur has also criticized Europe’s regional
human rights law as failing to define hate speech with sufficient
particularity. See UN SR 2016 Report, at ¶ 25.
41. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 26
Company prohibitions of threatening or promoting terrorism,
supporting or praising leaders of dangerous organizations and
content that promotes terrorist acts or incites violence are, like
counter-terrorism legislation, excessively vague. Company policies
on hate, harassment and abuse also do not clearly indicate what
constitutes an offence. Twitter’s prohibition of “behavior that
incites fear about a protected group” and Facebook’s distinction
between “direct attacks” on protected characteristics and merely
“distasteful or offensive content” are subjective and unstable bases
for content moderation.
42. See NADINE STROSSEN, HATE: WHY WE SHOULD RESIST IT WITH FREE
SPEECH, NOT CENSORSHIP 69–72 (2018) (explaining the role of the vagueness
standard in U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence).
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grounds of ambiguity43 and assesses that bans on such speech
are “insusceptible to precise, narrow definition.”44 When a ban
on such offensive speech contains a narrow definition, it often
fails for other reasons, such as viewpoint discrimination (laws
that prohibit offensive speech towards one group necessarily
discriminate against other groups).45 She cites a variety of
attempts to define hateful or offensive speech in other
countries that similarly fail a vagueness test.46 In sum, Article
19(3)’s “legality” condition poses a significant international
legal hurdle to speech regulation that seeks to ban insulting or
offensive speech.
2. The “Necessity” Condition: A Requirement to Use the Least
Intrusive Means
The second prong of ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite
test—the “necessity” condition—is understood to require that a
restriction on speech must reflect the least possible
infringement on expression rights for achieving a public
interest goal.47 In other words, if a speech restriction is not the

43. See id. at 71–72 (discussing, for example, a Supreme Court case that
struck down a law banning speech that undermined the “dignity” of
employees at foreign embassies as inherently subjective).
44. Id. at 72.
45. See id. at 74 (illustrating that under inclusion or selectivity can be
just as lethal to the legality of a speech law as vagueness). Similarly, the UN
Human Rights Committee has made clear that speech restrictions must
comply with other provisions in the ICCPR, including those that ban
discrimination. See GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 26
Laws restricting the rights enumerated in article 19, paragraph
2 . . . must not only comply with the strict requirements of article
19, paragraph 3 of the Covenant but must also themselves be
compatible with the provisions, aims and objectives of the
Covenant. Laws must not violate the non-discrimination
provisions of the Covenant.
ICCPR Article 26 prohibits discrimination “on any ground such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.” ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 26.
46. See STROSSEN, supra note 42, at 75–80 (demonstrating by various
examples from Canada and Europe that defining hate speech can be an
intractable problem).
47. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
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least intrusive way for achieving a governmental purpose, then
it cannot be “necessary” to achieve that purpose.48 The UN
Human Rights Committee has interpreted this prong to
require, inter alia, that the speech restriction must be “the
least intrusive” means for achieving a legitimate public
purpose.49 The UN Special Rapporteur has likewise stated that
governments “must demonstrate that the restriction imposes
the least burden on the exercise of the right and actually
protects, or is likely to protect, the legitimate State interest at
issue.”50
To make its case that it has selected the “least intrusive”
speech restriction,51 an ICCPR State Party must logically
conduct a three-step inquiry:
(1) Is there a way for the government to achieve the desired
public interest goal without banning speech?
(2) If the public purpose cannot be achieved without
infringing on speech, what means are available to achieve
the goal, and which one produces the “least intrusion” on
speech interests?
(3) Does the means selected actually help (or is it likely to
help) achieve the public interest goal? 52

48. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
49. See GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 34 (stating that speech restrictions
must be “the least intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve
their protective function”). The United States government has also stated
that it views the necessity condition as requiring that speech restrictions
“must be the least restrictive means for protecting the governmental interest
and are compatible with democratic principles.” U.S. OBSERVATIONS, supra
note 38, at 227. In addition, in order to meet the “necessity” condition, the
Committee has stated that restrictions must also meet the principle of
proportionality, i.e., that restrictions must “be proportionate to the interest
protected.” GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 34.
50. UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 7.
51. See GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 27 (stating that the government
bears the burden of proving that each part of the ICCPR Article 19(3)’s
tripartite test is met). The UN Special Rapporteur has also emphasized that
governments “may not merely assert necessity but must demonstrate it, in
the adoption of restrictive legislation and the restriction of specific
expression.” UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 7.
52. See Aswad, supra note 30, at 47 (proposing a similar three-step
inquiry in the context of assessing how social media platforms that engage in
content moderation could ensure they respect the “necessity” test in ICCPR
Article 19(3)). The UN Special Rapporteur recently cited favorably to my
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If the government can achieve a legitimate public interest
goal without banning speech or through a less restrictive
means, or if the selected means does not help achieve the goal,
then the government has not met its burden of selecting the
“least intrusive” means of attaining its goal.53 Failure to select
the “least intrusive” restriction results in the speech restriction
failing the “necessity” condition.54
At the UN, this trilogy of questions played out in heated
and divisive discussions that spanned over a decade.55 During
these discussions, diplomats contemplated whether it was
appropriate to ban a spectrum of offensive speech
encompassing religious intolerance/hate, blasphemy, and
insults to religious feelings.56 In 2011, at the UN Human
Rights Council, the international community adopted a
consensus resolution that commemorated a variety of
three-step inquiry in his report to the UN General Assembly, see David Kaye
(Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression,
¶ 52 U.N. DOC. A/74/486 (Oct. 9, 2019) [hereinafter UN SR 2019 Report]
Evelyn Aswad identifies three steps that a company should take
under the necessity framework: evaluate the tools it has available
to protect a legitimate objective without interfering with the
speech itself; identify the tool that least intrudes on speech; and
assess whether and demonstrate that the measure it selects
actually achieves its goals.
These three steps—assessing if there are measures short of speech bans to
achieve goals, determining the least intrusive speech infringement, and
monitoring effectiveness of speech infringements—apply whether a
government or company is seeking to demonstrate it acts consistently with
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s necessity condition.
53. See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
54. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 7 (“States must
demonstrate that the restriction imposes the least burden on the exercise of the
right and actually protects, or is likely to protect, the legitimate State interest at
issue.”).

55. See Evelyn M. Aswad, To Ban or Not to Ban Blasphemous Videos, 44
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1313, 1323 (2013) (discussing the UN debates and
discussions regarding censorship of blasphemous speech); see also Suzanne
Nossel, ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UN SYSTEM, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL. 15–16 (2012), https://perma.cc/P2TC-L3NC (PDF) (analyzing the debate
regarding censorship of blasphemous speech in the international arena).
56. See supra note 55.
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conclusions from these discussions.57 While it condemns
various manifestations of religious intolerance, Resolution
16/18 acknowledges that governments have a robust toolkit of
options that should be deployed before resorting to speech
bans.58 For example, the resolution urges governments to,
among other things, speak out against intolerance, train
government employees in effective outreach measures to
groups that may be subject to intolerance, promote interfaith
dialogues and educational initiatives to combat intolerance,
and implement robustly and fairly administered laws that ban
discriminatory acts or hate crimes.59 Moreover, the resolution
noted that the freedoms of expression and religion were an
important counter-weight to intolerance.60 In addition, this
resolution limited its call for speech bans to instances in which
the speech rises to incitement of imminent violence—a
standard that is consistent with the U.S. First Amendment.61

57. Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18
(Apr. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Council Res. 16/18].
58. See, e.g., id. ¶ 5(h) (“Recognizing that the open, constructive and
respectful debate of ideas, as well as interfaith and intercultural dialogue at
the local, national and international levels, can play a positive role in
combating religious hatred, incitement and violence[.]”).
59. Id. ¶¶ 4–6.
60. Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
61. See Aswad, supra note 55, at 1325 (noting that even the main
sponsor of the resolution recognized it was intended to be consistent with the
First Amendment by citing to Ufuk Gokcen, The Reality of Freedom of
Expression in the Muslim World, THE HILL (Oct. 19, 2012, 1:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/QTW5-GFUX (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (reflecting an
acknowledgment by a representative of the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation that Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18 uses “much of the
United States First Amendment language” to promote “respect for and
protection of the individual rights of all people”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review)); Jerome Socolovsky, Islamic Nations Relinquish
Demand for Defamation Laws, VOA (Oct. 24, 2012, 10:05 PM), https://
perma.cc/7QHW-EPM6 (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (quoting a representative
of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation as stating that that Resolution
16/18 protects the rights of individual believers as opposed to religion itself
and the framework “is compatible with the First Amendment”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a discussion of the First
Amendment standard on incitement to imminent violence, see infra note 107
and accompanying text.
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This resolution represents an important recognition that
governments have a variety of good governance measures at
their disposal to tackle intolerant, offensive, and insulting
speech before claiming a need to resort to speech bans.
Governments that do not implement what is known as the
“16/18 consensus toolkit”62 are hard pressed to justify their
speech bans as “the least intrusive means” to achieving a
legitimate purpose.63 Prohibitions against vague speech bans
and discrimination against particular groups, when coupled
with a requirement to use the least restrictive means to
achieve a legitimate goal, generally leave governments with
limited options for banning offensive speech. All in all, ICCPR
Article 19(3)’s “necessity” condition poses another significant
international legal hurdle to speech restrictions on insulting or
offensive speech and further supports the vision for broad
freedom of expression protections expressed in The Right to
Insult in International Law.64
3. The “Legitimacy” Condition: Speech Bans Must Be for Public
Interest Goals
The third prong of the tripartite test—the “legitimacy”
condition—requires that any speech bans be imposed for one of
the legitimate, enumerated rationales set forth in ICCPR
Article 19(3): “[f]or respect of the rights or reputations of
others; [f]or the protection of national security or of public
order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.”65 Both the
limited number of public interest rationales in the treaty text
62. Aswad, supra note 55, at 1328.
63. See id. at 1325–26 (noting that the use of the measures in
Resolution 16/18 obviates the need for “broad bans on speech”).
64. For example, The Right to Insult in International Law advocates for
speech protections “in line with the approach espoused by the U.S. Supreme
Court under the First Amendment,” Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 51,
and Council Res. 16/18 (coupled with relevant interpretations by the UN’s
independent experts, see, e.g., infra note 90) arguably does this by calling
upon states to ban offensive and hateful speech in only one
instance—incitement to imminent violence, which “reflects the U.S.
constitutional standard” for a permissible restriction on speech. Aswad,
supra note 55, at 1325.
65. ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 19(3).
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and the UN human rights machinery’s recommended
interpretations serve to limit governmental discretion under
this prong. The UN Human Rights Committee has warned
that these grounds cannot be invoked as pretexts for limiting
speech by emphasizing, for example, that “national security”
cannot be improperly invoked to suppress information that
does not actually harm national security.66 The Committee has
also cautioned that speech restrictions that are justified on
grounds of “public morals” are only valid if judged by the
“universality of human rights and the principle of
non-discrimination,”67 thereby seeking to constrain overly
broad or inappropriate invocations of this rationale. Finally,
the Committee has noted that the “rights . . . of others”
comprises the rights in the ICCPR as well as other parts of
international human rights law.68
The UN Human Rights Committee has criticized many
national laws that seek to ban insults of rulers, religion, and
royalty. For example, in its 2011 General Comment, the
Committee criticized penalties for criticism or insults of public
officials and royalty:
[T]he Committee has observed that in circumstances of
public debate concerning public figures in the political
domain and public institutions, the value placed by the
Covenant upon uninhibited expression is particularly high.
Thus, the mere fact that forms of expression are considered
to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify
the imposition of penalties . . . . [A]ll public figures,
including those exercising the highest political authority
such as heads of state and government, are legitimately
subject to criticism and political opposition. Accordingly,
the Committee expresses concern regarding laws on such
matters as, lese majesty [insulting royalty], desacato
[criticism of rulers], disrespect for authority, disrespect for

66. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 30.
67. Id. at ¶ 32. The UN Special Rapporteur reaffirmed this caution in
2018. UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 7.
68. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 28. The UN Special Rapporteur
reaffirmed this understanding in 2018. UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34,
at ¶ 7.
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flags and symbols, defamation of the head of state and the
protection of the honour of public officials . . . .69

Similarly, the UN Special Rapporteur has taken the view that
laws protecting rulers or royalty from criticism are “manifestly
inconsistent with freedom of expression.”70
The UN Human Rights Committee has also criticized bans
on blasphemy or other speech that insults religions or religious
sensibilities by stating the following:
Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a religion or
other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are
incompatible with the Covenant, except in the specific
circumstances envisaged in article 20, paragraph 2, of the
Covenant [i.e., advocacy of incitement to harm]. . . . [I]t
would be impermissible for any such laws to discriminate in
favour of or against one or certain religions or belief
systems, or their adherents over another, or religious
believers over non-believers. Nor would it be permissible for
such prohibitions to be used to prevent or punish criticism
of religious leaders or commentary on religious doctrine and
tenets of faith.71

The UN Special Rapporteur has likewise opined that religions
are not entitled to reputational protections under human
rights law,72 as has the UN’s top expert on freedom of
religion.73

69.
70.
71.
72.

GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 38 (footnotes omitted).
UN SR 2016 Report, supra note 40, at ¶ 33.
GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 48.

U.N. SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF OPINION AND EXPRESSION
ET
AL.,
JOINT DECLARATION ON DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS, AND
ANTI-TERRORISM AND ANTI-EXTREMISM LEGISLATION 2 (2008), https://perma.cc

/3C2L-7WWK (PDF) (noting the “defamation of religions” concept does not
meet international standards for defamation, explaining that religions are
not the subject of protection under these standards, and calling for an end to
resolutions promoting this topic at the UN).
73. See Asma Jahangir (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or
Belief) & Doudou Diène (Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance), Rep.
for Human Rights Council Decision 1/107 on Incitement to Racial and
Religious Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance, ¶¶ 27, 36, 37, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/2/3 (Sept. 20, 2006) (opining that international law does not protect
religions or beliefs from “criticism or ridicule”).
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4. Impacts on ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4

The authors also express concern about the scope of
ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4.74 ICCPR Article 20
requires bans on speech for “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence.”75 By its own terms,
Article 20 has an intent requirement because “advocacy”
necessitates an intention to promote a particular cause.76
However, many other terms in this article have been the
subject of significant debate.77 CERD Article 4 requires states,
with “due regard” to other human rights such as freedom of

74. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 37–43.
75. ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 20(2).
76. Aswad, supra note 55, at 1319.
77. The scope of this provision remains the subject of much debate
among UN member states. For example, a 2006 report by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights found that there was no consensus among
nation states about the meaning of key terms in this article, including
“incitement” and “hatred.” U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rep. on
Incitement to Racial and Religious Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance,
¶¶ 3, 5, 81, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/6 (Sept. 20, 2006). The UN subsequently
convened experts in four regional workshops to propose a way forward on the
scope of Article 20, which culminated in the Rabat Plan of Action, but it was
not endorsed by states. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Rabat Plan of
Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or Religious Hatred
that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence,
appendix, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4 (Jan. 11, 2013). Though the
precise scope of Article 20 remains under debate, the application of the
article is constrained by the fact that it is subject to Article 19’s tripartite
test. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. Even the negotiations about
this article were contentious. Aswad, supra note 55, at 1320–21. Eleanor
Roosevelt, the head of the U.S. delegation, fought to keep Article 20 out of
the ICCPR, arguing that:
(1) [I]t was wholly out of place in a human rights treaty to
empower and require states to ban speech; (2) such a provision
would be abused by repressive regimes to justify problematic
crackdowns on speech; (3) the wording of the provision was
ambiguous, which was very dangerous and would compound
governmental abuse; and (4) the principle of democracy was better
served by allowing individuals to create disputes than by
suppressing speech.
Id. at 1321. Article 20 was eventually included in the ICCPR after a
splintered vote. Id.
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expression, to criminalize expressions of racial superiority and
incitement to racial violence, among other forms of racial hate
speech.78
Though it would have been preferable from a freedom of
expression viewpoint if ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4
had not been included in those treaties, the potential breadth
of these articles is significantly limited because ICCPR Article
19(3)’s tripartite test continues to apply to restrictions imposed
under these two provisions.79 Indeed, it would be inconceivable
to contemplate that either human rights treaty would
empower governments to restrict speech even if the bans are
vague, improperly promulgated, or unnecessary to achieve
public interest purposes.
The UN treaty bodies that monitor implementation of
these two treaties have made clear that any prohibitions
implemented pursuant to these articles must meet ICCPR
Article 19’s tripartite test. For example, in General Comment
34, the UN Human Rights Committee stated, “[A] limitation
that is justified on the basis of article 20 must also comply with

78. CERD Article 4 provides:
States Parties . . . undertake to adopt immediate and positive
measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such
discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention [which
includes freedom of expression], inter alia: (a) Shall declare an
offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any
race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin, and
also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including
the financing thereof . . . .
CERD, supra note 25, at art. 4 (emphasis added). During the negotiations on
this article, the United States expressed concerns, but eventually voted in
favor of it on the basis that the “due regard” clause meant implementation of
this article would be subject to protections for freedom of expression. See
U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1318th mtg. at 152, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1318
(Oct. 25, 1965) (“[The U.S. delegate] emphasized that her delegation had
been able to support the text only on the understanding that . . . article IV
did not impose on a State Party the obligation to take any action impairing
the right to freedom of speech and freedom of association.”).
79. See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
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article 19, paragraph 3.”80 Similarly, in its General
Recommendation 35, the UN CERD Committee, which is the
body of independent experts elected by State Parties to
monitor implementation of the CERD, took the view that any
prohibitions imposed under Article 4 must comply with Article
19(3)’s conditions of legality and necessity.81 The UN CERD
Committee also stated that application of Article 4 requires
“due regard” for other human rights, particularly freedom of
expression, which is “the most pertinent reference principle
when calibrating the legitimacy of speech restrictions.”82
80. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 50. The Committee goes on to say that in
“every case in which the State restricts freedom of expression it is necessary
to justify the prohibitions and their provisions in strict conformity with
article 19.” Id. at ¶ 52.
81. See Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation No. 35, ¶¶ 12, 19, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/35 (Sept. 26,
2013) [hereinafter CERD GR 35] (“The application of criminal sanctions
should be governed by principles of legality, proportionality and necessity.”).
Presumably, the UN CERD Committee did not mention the condition of
“legitimacy” because CERD Article 4 provides the legitimate public interest
goal for restricting such speech. The UN CERD Committee also mentioned
the principle of proportionality, which falls under the “necessity” condition.
See supra note 49. The UN Special Rapporteur has also emphasized that any
speech restrictions, including those imposed under ICCPR Article 20 or
CERD Article 4, must comply with ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test. UN
SR 2019 Report, supra note 52, at ¶¶ 13, 16; UN SR 2016 Report, supra note
40, at ¶¶ 17, 25.
82. CERD GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶ 19. The authors note that CERD
Article 4’s “due regard” clause has been interpreted by some to mean free
expression principles must be complied with, others view it as meaning a
balance must be struck between freedom of expression and the need to
combat racism, and yet others believe the criminal bans on racist speech are
mandatory regardless of other human rights. Clooney & Webb, supra note
14, at 19 n.78. General Recommendation 35 seems to espouse the first
interpretation given it emphasizes compliance with ICCPR Article 19’s
tripartite test for laws that implement CERD Article 4 and even notes the
“due regard” clause means assessing restrictions against this tripartite test.
See CERD GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶ 12 (requiring consideration of the
“principles of legality, proportionality and necessity”). It is unclear why The
Right to Insult in International Law describes General Recommendation 35
as not permitting consideration of freedom of expression rights in the
application of CERD Article 4. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 19
(stating that the UN CERD Committee refuses to give effect to give “due
regard” to freedom of expression and mandates the criminalization of racist
hate speech without regard to the legality or necessity conditions). This
reading overlooks the UN CERD Committee’s explicit endorsement of giving
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For the reasons discussed above, the applicability of
ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test to any speech bans imposed
under ICCPR Article 20 or CERD Article 4 significantly
curtails the potential breadth of these articles as laws
implemented under such provisions must not, inter alia, be
vague and must constitute the least intrusive means to
prevent harm.83 Though the applicability of this tripartite test
to speech restrictions, including those imposed under ICCPR
Article 20 and CERD Article 4, was not noted in The Right to
Insult in International Law,84 it significantly furthers the
authors’ vision for freedom of expression protections in
international law.
5. Reflections on the State of UN Human Rights Law and
Insulting/Offensive Speech
An analysis of ICCPR Article 19 reveals that its tripartite
conditions of legality, necessity, and legitimacy are robust and
due regard to freedom of expression in General Recommendation 35 and its
call to apply the legality and necessity principles in assessing any criminal
bans imposed under Article 4. CERD GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶¶ 12, 19. The
authors also state that a 2011 UN Special Rapporteur report takes the view
that CERD Article 4 does not require consideration of expression rights.
Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 19 n.80. This report, however, cited to
views of the UN CERD Committee that pre-dated its 2013 General
Recommendation Number 35, which reflects the UN CERD Committee’s
latest guidance on Article 4. See Frank La Rue (Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. A/66/290
(Aug. 10, 2011) (stating the Committee’s view from 1993 that “the
prohibition of the dissemination of all ideas based upon racial superiority or
hatred is compatible with the right to freedom of opinion and expression”
(quoting Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation XV (42) on Article 4 of the Convention, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/48
/18 (Mar. 17, 1993))).
83. See supra notes 24–73 and accompanying text (discussing why such
conditions make it difficult for hate speech laws to pass muster under ICCPR
Article 19’s tripartite test).
84. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 15–19, 38–43 (discussing the
criminalization of racially-motivated hate speech that appears to be required
under the “plain language” of CERD Article 4, for example, but overlooking
the fact that such criminalization must nevertheless satisfy the tripartite
test).
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constitute substantial legal hurdles for governments to
surmount in order to justify any speech restrictions, including
those imposed under ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4.85
Restrictions on insulting or otherwise offensive speech often
fail because they are either vague or are not the least intrusive
means to fulfill legitimate ends that can be achieved through
good governance measures or a less onerous restriction.86 This
is fully consistent with the authors’ view that “a myriad of
non-legal tools” are available to combat offensive or insulting
speech87 and that criminal bans on speech may be ineffective
or even counterproductive.88 At times, restrictions on insulting
speech will fail because they are imposed for an illegitimate
reason, like seeking to protect rulers, religions, and royalty
from insults.89 Application of this tripartite test has put the
UN human rights machinery on a path towards only
permitting bans on offensive speech where there is an intent to
cause harm and a likelihood of near term harm.90
While many states have laws that conflict with
international law standards, that fact does not mean the
85. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., UN SR 2016 Report, supra note 40, at ¶¶ 14, 25, 33 (noting
examples of counter-terrorism and hate speech laws that fail ICCPR Article
19(3)’s vagueness test and highlighting that criminal penalties or inordinate
civil penalties for defamation and libel are excessive, i.e., not necessary).
87. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 41.
88. See id. at 43 (citing the rise of hate speech and hate crimes in
Europe despite “robust” criminal laws targeting such conduct). See also
STROSSEN, supra note 42, at 133–82 (explaining why hate speech laws can be
ineffective and even counterproductive while non-censorial methods can be
more effective in combatting intolerance).
89. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text (discussing the UN
human rights machinery’s criticism of laws that forbid insults to rulers,
religions, or royalty).
90. See CERD GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶ 16 (noting that in assessing
incitement “the intention of the speaker, and the imminent risk or likelihood
that the conduct desired or intended by the speaker will result from the
speech in question” should be taken into account); Frank La Rue (Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 46, U.N.
Doc. A/67/357 (Sept. 7, 2012) [hereinafter UN SR 2012 Report] (noting
assessments of incitement should consider “real and imminent danger of
violence resulting from the expression” and the speaker’s intention to incite).
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international treaties or the UN human rights machinery fail
to adequately protect insulting or otherwise offensive speech.
Rather, it means that states are either violating their ICCPR
obligations or (for those not party to the ICCPR) acting
inconsistently with international standards.91 In sum, the
violation of norms is a different problem from the authors’
alleged insufficiency of the norms and necessitates different
solutions, as discussed in Part III.
B. Why the International Law Regime Is Not Riddled with
Contradictory Approaches to Insulting or Otherwise Offensive
Speech
In The Right to Insult in International Law, the authors
take the position that the international machinery charged
with interpreting freedom of expression standards has issued
contradictory interpretations about the permissibility of bans
on insulting or otherwise offensive speech.92 To the extent that
the authors argue that the UN’s international human rights
machinery and regional human rights mechanisms have
issued inconsistent decisions on the scope of freedom of
expression, I agree.93 Though this state of affairs is
unfortunate, Part II.B.1 below explains why it does not render
the UN human rights regime incoherent. Given that the UN
and regional mechanisms interpret different treaties, differing
approaches between the international and regional systems do
not indicate fundamental flaws within the UN human rights
system. To the extent that the authors argue that the various
components within the UN machinery have issued inconsistent
decisions about freedom of expression, Part II.B.2 below
explains why the alleged contradictions in the UN’s guidance
91. For example, the Human Rights Committee has expressed concern
over laws that harshly penalize speech that is critical of public officials and
government institutions in countries such as the Dominican Republic and
Zambia. GC 34, supra note 35, at 9–10.
92. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 44 (“[A] close study of
international legal sources reveals inconsistent guidance on the question of
when international law permits insults.”); id. at 46 (“[I]nternational law also
diverges on the issue of denial laws, which protect against insults to the
memories of deceased victims of crimes.”).
93. See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
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are best understood as an evolution in the UN machinery’s
interpretations toward greater speech protections rather than
as unworkable inconsistencies within the system.
1. The UN Human Rights Machinery v. Regional Human
Rights Mechanisms
The authors properly observe that the UN’s international
human rights machinery, on the one hand, and regional
human rights bodies, on the other, approach the scope of
freedom of expression in different ways.94 For example, the
authors note that the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) has upheld the criminalization of atrocity denial
under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
but that the UN Human Rights Committee views such laws as
incompatible with the ICCPR.95 The authors also highlight
that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that,
under certain circumstances, criminalization of defamation is
permissible under the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights whereas the UN Human Rights Committee has taken a

94. The authors focus on the European, African, and Inter-American
human rights systems in their article, see, e.g., Clooney & Webb, supra note
14, at 24–25 n.101 (citing cases from the human rights courts in those
regions), but there are other sub-global systems as well. For example, the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s human rights system is based in part
on the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam that limits expression by
reference to Shariah norms. Org. of Islamic Cooperation, The Cairo
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, Annex to Res. No. 49/19-P, art. 22
(Aug. 5, 1990), https://perma.cc/QW9C-VXGN (PDF). The Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) also has a human rights declaration,
which limits rights (including freedom of expression) in ways that are
inconsistent with the UN human rights regime. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of State, ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights (Nov. 20, 2012), https://
perma.cc/7GYA-EYS4 (last visited Dec. 27, 2019) (“While part of the ASEAN
Declaration adopted November 18 tracks the [Universal Declaration of
Human Rights], we are deeply concerned that many of the ASEAN
Declaration’s principles and articles could weaken and erode universal
human rights and fundamental freedoms as contained in the UDHR.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
95. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 46 (comparing the views of
the Human Rights Committee’s GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 49, with the
ECtHR’s decision in Witzsch v. Germany, App. No. 7485/03, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
(Dec. 13, 2005), https://perma.cc/M9BR-XGSQ (PDF)).
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strong stand against it when interpreting the ICCPR.96 In
addition, the authors spotlight the European Court’s use of a
“guillotine” provision to deny highly offensive speech any
protection under the ECHR whereas the UN Human Rights
Committee gives all speech the protection of ICCPR Article
19’s tripartite test.97
Though there can be no doubt that the UN machinery and
regional mechanisms have taken differing approaches
concerning the scope of freedom of expression, such differences
do not render the UN treaties or their associated
interpretations by UN bodies inconsistent or incoherent. The
international human rights law regime for freedom of
expression is comprised of UN treaties (such as the ICCPR)
that apply to State Parties around the world.98 The UN’s
international human rights treaties create committees of
independent experts from around the world to monitor treaty
96. See id. at 45–46 (“[T]he U.N. has spoken out strongly against
criminal defamation . . . . [T]he Inter-American Court has held that criminal
defamation is legitimate where it ‘meets the requirements of necessity and
proportionality’ . . . .” (quoting Mémoli v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter‑Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
265, ¶ 126 (Aug. 22, 2013))).
97. Id. at 22. There are many other differences between the
interpretations of the UN human rights machinery and the European Court
of Human Rights. For example, the UN Human Rights Committee and UN
Special Rapporteur have consistently spoken out against bans on blasphemy.
See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. The European Court of
Human Rights, on the contrary, has consistently upheld blasphemy bans
when interpreting the ECHR. See, e.g., Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria,
295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (upholding prior restraint on a film that
could offend the religious sensibilities of Christians); E.S. v Austria, App.
38450/12, Eur. Ct. H.R., (Oct. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/5JDN-FN78 (last
visited Dec. 28, 2019) (upholding conviction for disparaging Islamic religious
doctrines) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition,
the European Court of Human Rights has created a doctrine called the
“margin of appreciation,” in which it defers to the judgment of governments,
particularly when there are different interpretations of treaty rights among
European nations. PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 946–48 (2012). The UN Human Rights Committee, on the other
hand, has made clear that it does not apply a margin of appreciation to
freedom of expression issues. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 36.
98. See ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 48(1) (providing that any member
of the United Nations and certain other states can become a party to the
ICCPR).
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implementation and recommend interpretations of their
texts.99 The UN Human Rights Council also periodically selects
an independent expert (the Special Rapporteur) to monitor,
report, and provide recommendations on global freedom of
expression issues.100 The various regional systems have their
own treaties and monitoring and enforcement mechanisms,
but they only apply within their respective areas of the
world.101 The regional human rights courts are not empowered
to interpret the ICCPR; the UN system is not empowered to
interpret the regional treaties. Just because regional courts
and mechanisms assess their respective treaties to have a
narrower scope for freedom of expression than the ICCPR102
does not mean that the UN system—its treaties and the
interpretations issued by its machinery—is somehow rendered
inconsistent. It simply means that the international and
regional systems provide different levels of protection for
freedom of expression.
This is not to say that it is an advisable state of affairs for
the international and regional systems to take inconsistent
views on the scope of freedom of expression. For those of us
who favor broad protections for freedom of expression, it is
disheartening that regional systems provide fewer speech
protections and it would be preferable if they would adopt the
UN machinery’s approaches. This state of affairs is also
unfortunate because countries often cite to the jurisprudence
99. See, e.g., id. art. 28(1) (“There shall be established a Human Rights
Committee . . . . It shall consist of eighteen members and shall carry out the
functions hereinafter provided.”); CERD, supra note 25, at art. 8(1) (“There
shall be established a Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination . . . consisting of eighteen experts of high moral
standing . . . .”).
100. See Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUM. RTS., https://perma.cc/DD4N-VUXG (last visited Jan. 8, 2020)
(explaining the establishment of the Special Rapporteur’s mandate in 1993
and the periodic extensions thereof) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
101. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. NO. 005,
art. 59 (establishing that only members of the Council of Europe can become
state parties to the Convention).
102. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
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of their regional machinery to justify their actions when they
are accused of violating UN human rights treaties. For
example, when the UN Special Rapporteur wrote to Germany
to express a host of serious concerns with its Network
Enforcement Act,103 Germany defended its law based on
European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence.104 Though
invocation of a regional treaty cannot justify a country’s
violation of its international treaty obligations,105 such
attempts may prove dangerous over time as they could
eventually erode UN protections for speech when ICCPR State
Parties invoke regional norms and worldviews to advocate for
lower speech protection standards at the international level.
2. Unworkable Inconsistencies Within the UN’s Human Rights
Machinery or an Evolution of Interpretative Guidance?
The authors also take the position that the UN human
rights machinery’s guidance on the scope of protection for
freedom of expression is internally inconsistent. This Part
posits that such differences would be better characterized as
an evolution in the thinking of these bodies, with more recent
interpretations reflecting a progression towards broader
protections for speech. Such an evolution in legal
interpretation happens as well within domestic court systems.
For example, U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence once upheld
bans on speech that had a “bad tendency” to cause harm.106
103. Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement
Act], Sept. 1, 2017, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL I] at 3352 (Ger.),
https://perma.cc/V46W-J3A4 (PDF).
104. See Letter from Federal Government of Germany, Answers to the
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom
of Opinion and Expression in Regard to the Act to Improve Enforcement of
the Law in Social Networks (Network Enforcement Act) 3 (June 1, 2017),
https://perma.cc/95YG-MKAK (PDF) (“Likewise, the European Court of
Human Rights in its case-law has made abundantly clear that hate speech is
intolerable in a democratic society.”).
105. As noted by the UN Special Rapporteur, “[r]egional human rights
norms cannot, in any event, be invoked to justify departure from
international human rights protections.” UN SR 2019 Report, supra note 52,
at ¶ 26.
106. See ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A
BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 23–38, 157–167 (2007) (noting that this
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Over time, however, it shifted towards a more rigorous
standard that requires the speaker’s intent to cause lawless
action that is both likely and imminent.107 This Part analyzes
the authors’ main examples of the UN machinery’s alleged
inconsistencies and proposes that these decisions should
instead be viewed as an evolution in the thinking of these
bodies, which appear to be on a trajectory towards greater
protections for speech.
As evidence of an inconsistency within the UN human
rights machinery, the authors note the UN CERD Committee’s
differing views as to what constitutes “incitement.”108 In
particular, the authors highlight that the UN CERD
Committee’s General Recommendation 35 states that
incitement should include the “imminent risk or likelihood
that the conduct desired or intended by the speaker will result
from the speech . . . .”109 The authors then contrast this
standard with individual complaints decisions issued by the
UN CERD Committee and UN Human Rights Committee.110
However, the cited individual complaints decisions were all

view prevailed in early twentieth-century cases such as Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907)).
107. See id. at 157–67 (discussing the ruling in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969)).
108. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 36 (comparing the CERD
Committee’s General Recommendation 35 with its decisions in individual
complaints as well as the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34).
109. Id. (quoting CERD GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶ 16).
110. See id. (“[I]n many cases both the Human Rights Committee and the
CERD Committee have sanctioned criminal convictions for speech without
explicitly taking into account whether a prohibited impact was foreseen,
likely or imminent.”). The UN’s Human Rights Committee and CERD
Committee can hear individual complaints against States Parties for treaty
violations if those governments have consented to subject themselves to such
complaints. See Human Rights Treaty Bodies—Individual Communications,
OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., https://perma.cc/4YZYUNWQ (last visited Jan. 8, 2020) (“Anyone can lodge a complaint with a
Committee against a State that satisfies these two conditions (being a party
to the treaty and having accepted the Committee’s competence to examine
individual complaints), claiming that his or her rights under the relevant
treaty have been violated.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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decided before CERD General Recommendation 35 was issued
in 2013.111
This General Recommendation should be viewed as an
evolution in the Committee’s thinking on bans on racist hate
speech rather than an inconsistency in its jurisprudence.
Before issuing formal recommended interpretations of treaties,
UN treaty committee members engage in a consultation
process that canvases the views of State Parties and civil
society organizations.112 After such consultations, committees
hold intensive deliberations that can take years before issuing
the committee’s ultimate views.113 Such a period of intensive
deliberation and reflection can easily mark a turning point and
evolution in the UN CERD Committee’s thinking on Article 4,
just as seminal cases decided over a prolonged period can
spark transitions in a domestic court’s jurisprudence.114
The authors also express concern about potential
contradictions between the UN Human Rights Committee and
the UN CERD Committee with respect to the criminalization

111. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 36 n.165 (citing UN Human
Rights Committee decisions from 1996, 2000, and 2009 as well as a UN
CERD Committee decision from 2005).
112. See, e.g., Michael O’Flaherty, Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Human
Rights Committee’s General Comment 34, 12 HUM RTS. L. REV. 627, 650
(2012) (discussing submissions by States Parties and other stakeholders
suggesting changes to a draft of General Comment 34).
113. See id. at 645 (describing the process by which the UN Human
Rights Committee developed General Comment 34).
114. On the topic of inconsistencies on “incitement” by the UN
machinery, the authors also state that a draft of the UN Human Rights
Committee’s General Comment 34 contained language that stated Article 20
required advocacy that was “likely to trigger imminent acts,” but that such
guidance was not included in the final version of the General Comment.
Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 36. The lead drafter on the UN Human
Rights Committee for this 2011 General Comment has explained that “he
had not been mandated to develop general comment guidance on [Article 20]”
and was only able to reach consensus on text that explained the relationship
between Articles 19 and 20. O’Flaherty, supra note 112, at 647–49. Thus,
removal of the draft language interpreting Article 20 may have reflected a
need to stay within the mandate to develop guidance on Article 19 rather
than a definitive, substantive stance by the UN Human Rights Committee on
the drafter’s proposed language interpreting Article 20.
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of defamation.115 The authors note that in 2011 the UN Human
Rights Committee had “spoken out strongly against criminal
defamation” in both an individual complaints decision and its
General Comment 34,116 but cite to a 2003 UN CERD
Committee individual complaints decision, in which it upheld a
criminal defamation conviction in Denmark, as evidence of
being out of step with its sister committee.117 This decision was
issued well before the UN CERD Committee’s 2013 General
Recommendation 35, which sets forth how the Committee will
analyze the criminalization of such speech applying the
conditions of legality and necessity in future cases.118 Might
115. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 44–45.
116. Id. at 45 n.203, 204. The article also notes that the UN Special
Rapporteur
“consistently
advocates
the
decriminalization
of
defamation. . . . [but] has, on occasion, implicitly regarded criminal
defamation laws as acceptable.” Id. at 45 n.205. The article cites as an
example a 2016 letter of the UN Special Rapporteur to the Netherlands
about his concern and criticism of the country’s lese-majeste [insulting
royalty] laws. Id. It is unclear why the article views this letter as an implicit
approval of criminal defamation laws. In this letter, the Special Rapporteur
condemns such laws as not proportional (i.e., they fail ICCPR Article 19’s
tripartite test) and cites to the UN Human Rights Committee’s criticisms of
criminal defamation in General Comment 34. Letter from David Kaye, U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom
of Opinion and Expression, to Roderick van Schreven, Permanent
Representative of the Netherlands to the United Nations, 3–4 (Oct. 14,
2016), https://perma.cc/4ZQZ-VKNA (PDF). This footnote also cites to an
opinion by Europe’s Commission for Democracy through Law (also known as
the Venice Commission). Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 45 n.205.
However, the Venice Commission is not part of the UN’s machinery (instead
being part of Europe’s regional human rights system) and thus not relevant
to the argument that the guidance issued by the UN machinery is internally
inconsistent. Moreover, this Venice Commission decision re-states General
Comment 34’s criticism of criminal defamation laws. See Venice Comm’n,
Opinion on Articles 216, 299, 301 and 314 of the Penal Code of Turkey,
Opinion No. 831/2015, ¶ 56 (Mar. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/3GS5-DBYS
(PDF) (“Under Article 19 ICCPR, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee has also urged that ‘States parties should consider the
decriminalization of defamation . . . and imprisonment is never an
appropriate penalty.” (quoting GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 47)).
117. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 45 n.206.
118. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. Moreover, the 2003
CERD individual complaints decision also pre-dates the UN Human Rights
Committee’s General Comment 34, which was issued in 2011. GC 34, supra
note 35. Often the UN CERD Committee will consider the views of its sister
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not this chronological sequencing of events be better viewed as
an evolution in the guidance of the UN bodies towards greater
protections for speech rather than an unworkable
inconsistency?
The authors also argue that the UN Human Rights
Committee and the UN CERD Committee have at times
suggested that State Parties must satisfy an intent
requirement before banning incitement to discrimination,
hostility, or violence and at other times seem to have approved
of such bans without insisting on such a showing.119 For
example, the authors highlight the UN CERD Committee’s
General Recommendation 35, which states that any
convictions for incitement should satisfy an intent standard.120
The article then cites to a variety of UN Human Rights
Committee and UN CERD Committee individual complaints
decisions that “have allowed convictions for hate speech to
stand even where there was no analysis of intent . . . .”121 All of
the individual complaints decisions cited to for this proposition
pre-date the UN Human Rights Committee’s General
Comment 34 (from 2011) and the UN CERD Committee’s

committee, the UN Human Rights Committee, in its work. See, e.g., CERD
GR 35, supra note 81, at ¶¶ 4, 6 (highlighting the UN Human Rights
Committee General Comment 34 in noting its use of sister committees’
interpretations). The article also cites to UN CERD Committee individual
complaints decisions from April 15, 2005 and April 4, 2013. Clooney & Webb,
supra note 14, at 45 n.208. Both decisions pre-dated the UN CERD
Committee’s General Recommendation 35, which was issued in September
2013.
119. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 33 (“Nevertheless, both the
CERD Committee and the Human Rights Committee have allowed
convictions for hate speech to stand even where there was no analysis of
intent, including in recent years.” (footnotes omitted)).
120. See id.
[I]n its 2013 General Recommendation on racial hate speech the
CERD Committee published new guidance that State parties
should recognize as “important elements” of any offence of
incitement “the intention of the speaker and the imminent risk or
likelihood that the conduct desired or intended by the speaker will
result from the speech in question.”
121. Id.
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General Recommendation 35 (from 2013).122 Again, when one
examines the chronology of the cited decisions and the overall
trajectory towards greater protections for freedom of
expression, it seems more appropriate to view this sequencing
as an evolution in the UN machinery’s thinking rather than as
an unworkable or problematic inconsistency.
3. Reflections on Alleged Inconsistencies in UN Freedom of
Expression Interpretations
An analysis of the alleged inconsistencies in the
international law regime results in two main conclusions.
First, although the UN’s international human rights regime
and the various regional human rights regimes approach
freedom of expression differently, that fact does not somehow
render the UN regime incoherent or inconsistent.123 It simply
means that the UN system provides more protections for
speech than the regional systems.124 This state of affairs risks
eroding UN standards over time when governments
improperly invoke their regional standards for freedom of
expression as an excuse for not implementing their
international human rights obligations or assert that regional
interpretations can define the scope of international human
rights obligations.125 Unfortunately, collapsing the UN and
regional systems to conclude that the “international” system is
incoherent only strengthens the potential for such erosion
because it incentivizes countries that oppose UN standards to
counter them by creating and invoking “competing” regional
norms.
Second, based on the specific arguments made in The
Right to Insult in International Law, it appears that the
alleged inconsistencies within the UN machinery are more
likely evolutions in the thinking of the UN mechanisms rather

122. See id. at 33 nn.148–49 (citing individual complaint decisions from
1996, 2003, 2005, and 2009).
123. See supra Part II.B.1.
124. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 104–105 and accompanying text.
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than problems that render their interpretations incoherent.126
Though the article usually contrasted earlier decisions of the
UN’s oversight machinery with its most recent decisions and
commentary to find inconsistencies, the sequencing of the cited
decisions and interpretations reflect an evolution towards
greater speech protections. The United States domestic legal
system underwent a similar evolution, with the Supreme
Court gradually expanding protections for speech over time.
The UN’s trajectory towards greater recognition of speech
protections should be reinforced rather than dismissed as
unworkable inconsistencies.
III. Assessment of Proposals to Promote Free Expression at the
International Level
The authors make four recommendations for promoting
broad protections for insulting or offensive speech at the
international level, including by updating the existing
international regime or seeking particular interpretations of
existing provisions.127 The authors conclude by calling on
126. The point of this analysis is not to argue that the UN machinery’s
interpretations are perfect or always consistent, but rather to address the
particular claims about systemic inconsistences that are made in The Right
to Insult in International Law, which (as discussed in Part I) has resulted in
the article being cited for the proposition that the UN human rights regime
for freedom of expression may be problematic in the context of content
moderation by global platforms. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
127.
See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 53–54 (proposing that CERD
Article 4 be deleted or “excluded through reservations,” that “states should
enter reservations to ICCPR Article 20,” that outdated concepts not be
utilized “to justify the criminalization of insults,” and that ECHR Article 17
and ICCPR Article 5 should be made inapplicable to “freedom of expression
cases”). The authors also set forth recommendations for action at the
domestic level, including: the recognition in local laws of a “right to insult”
unless the expression intends to create violence or other crimes and is likely
to do so; the abolition of criminal laws on insulting rulers, religion, and
royalty as well as bans on denials of historic atrocities; and an end to
misusing counter-terrorism or public order laws to ban insulting speech. Id.
at 52–53. I generally agree with the substance of these recommendations.
However, as previously discussed in Part II, these recommendations already
align with existing UN treaty texts and reasonable interpretations of those
treaties by the UN’s human rights machinery. See supra notes 66–84 and
accompanying text. The reason countries have problematic laws that ban
insulting rulers, religion, or royalty is not because international law
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private platforms to be guided by international human rights
law, as amended by their recommendations, in curating online
content.128 This Part evaluates each proposal, determines that
the international regime is much closer to the authors’ vision
than they had assessed, and proposes more impactful ways of
achieving the authors’ important goal of promoting broad
speech protections at the international level.
A. CERD Article 4
The authors’ first recommendation is that “CERD Article 4
should be deleted by the agreement of States Parties or
excluded through reservations.”129 Although the CERD does
provide an amendment procedure,130 given the alarming global

standards are lacking but because the countries lack the political will to
change their laws and nations have not afforded effective enforcement
mechanisms for international human rights treaties. See Alberto Cerda
Silva, Protecting Free Speech in the Digital Age: Q&A with UN Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, FORD FOUNDATION (Oct. 11, 2016),
https://perma.cc/9LCJ-QXE9 (last visited Jan. 7, 2020)
Around the world, governments are stretching the meaning of
what’s permitted [under ICCPR Article 19]: They define national
security in broad, vague ways that make it difficult for individuals
to know what speech or opinions are allowed and what may be
subject to penalty, they apply restrictions that go well beyond
what is necessary to address specific threats, and they fail to
justify their restrictions.
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). It is therefore important,
as I argue later in this Article, for human rights advocacy to invoke and
promote ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test and the most recent guidance from
the UN’s human rights machinery in order to protect freedom of expression
at the international level. See infra Part III.E.
128. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54 (advocating for technology
companies to use international human rights law as well as the authors’
suggestions as guides for determining whether online content should be
removed).
129. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 53.
130. The CERD requires that a State Party submit any request for
revision of the treaty to the UN Secretary General and that the UN General
Assembly decide how to proceed. See CERD, supra note 25, at art. 23
(1) A request for the revision of this Convention may be made at
any time by any State Party by means of a notification in writing
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. (2) The
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trend toward greater governmental repression of speech,131 it
is not likely that opening up a negotiation among states on
CERD Article 4 would result in its deletion rather than further
restrictions on speech, especially because governments tend to
fight for text that justifies their existing domestic practices in
multilateral human rights fora.132 For example, for many
years, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation—which
represents fifty-seven nations—led an effort at the UN to
develop a protocol to the CERD that would have further
restricted speech by banning the “defamation of religions,” an
umbrella concept that includes blasphemy, insults to religions,
and other speech that offends religious sensibilities.133 A
General Assembly of the United Nations shall decide upon the
steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request.
In a prior attempt to amend the CERD in the early 1990s, the General
Assembly approved the proposed amendment subject to a proviso that it
would not go into force until two-thirds of the State Parties had endorsed it,
which has not yet occurred. See Amendment to Article 8 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1,
United Nations Treaty Collection (Jan. 15, 1992), https://perma.cc/7LL4939H (PDF) (documenting the status of the proposed amendment).
131. As the authors noted, “the tide around the world is turning against
free speech . . . .” Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 55. See also Democracy
in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019, 5 FREEDOM HOUSE, https://perma.cc
/PRA3-JVRE (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (finding that “data show freedom of
expression declining each year over the past [thirteen] years, with sharper
drops since 2012”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For an
overview of the growing European restrictions on speech, see David Kaye,
How Europe’s New Internet Laws Threaten Freedom of Expression: Recent
Regulations Risk Censoring Legitimate Content, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 18,
2017), https://perma.cc/SU9Y-8TE5 (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (explaining
European countries’ attempts to regulate online speech and the impact that
has on private internet companies and individuals) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). See also Dangerously Disproportionate:
The Ever-Expanding National Security State in Europe, AMNESTY INT’L (Jan.
17, 2017), https://perma.cc/GAV5-6QPQ (last visited Mar. 18, 2020)
(reporting on European governments’ responses to national security threats
and the adverse effect of those responses on a variety of rights including
freedom of expression) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. See infra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.
133. See Robert C. Blitt, Defamation of Religion: Rumors of Its Death Are
Greatly Exaggerated, 62 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 347, 365–66 (2011)
(discussing how a committee was formed at the UN to develop a protocol to
the CERD that would have criminalized blasphemy). Freedom House and
members of civil society expressed alarm at the attempt by states at the UN
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sustained diplomatic effort by many countries, including the
United States, and civil society avoided that outcome, aligned
the discussions with international human rights law, and
shifted the focus to measures that would combat religious
intolerance and negative stereotyping without banning
speech.134 Amending existing human rights treaties during a
time of rising governmental restrictions on speech would not
bode well for achieving deletion of CERD Article 4 or the larger
goal of promoting the broadest possible speech protections.
Instead, at any negotiation to amend the CERD, governments
would more likely seek to commemorate text that justifies
their problematic laws, including those that the authors
highlight in their survey of worldwide bans on insults against
rulers, religion, and royalty.135
The authors’ recommendation provides in the alternative
that nations should take a reservation to CERD Article 4.136
to amend the CERD to criminalize the “defamation of religions.” See
FREEDOM HOUSE, FACT SHEET: DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS 1–2 (2009), https://
perma.cc/3GDT-HQY4 (PDF) (explaining why “the concept of ‘defamation of
religions’” is problematic); L. Bennett Graham, No to an International
Blasphemy Law, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2010, 11:30 EDT), https://perma.cc
/AQ37-4RRE (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (arguing against the adoption of an
international treaty banning blasphemy on the grounds that the human
rights regime is intended to protect human beings and not ideas) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. See Nossel, supra note 55, at 15–16 (detailing the role of the United
States in dissuading the passage of a defamation of religion protocol at the
UN). The risk of re-igniting the process to develop a protocol to the CERD to
criminalize the “defamation of religions” remains and freedom of expression
advocates have been vigilant in fighting against such attempts to re-open
speech restrictions in the CERD. See UN HRC: Initiative to Criminalise “Acts
of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature” Must Adhere to Freedom of Expression
Standards, ARTICLE 19 (Mar. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/CD2X-TJ26 (last
visited Dec. 29, 2019) (urging states at the Human Rights Council to “to
guard against any new binding instrument that may be used as a vehicle to
undermine protections for freedom of expression and equality”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
135. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 3–13 (reviewing and
categorizing various countries’ laws on “insulting rulers,” “insulting religion,”
and “insulting royalty”).
136. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 53 (“CERD Article 4 should
be deleted by the agreement of States Parties or excluded through
reservations”). The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a
reservation as “a unilateral statement . . . made by a State, when signing,
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But it is questionable how helpful this strategy would be in
promoting broad international legal protections for freedom of
expression. Although the CERD has a procedure for lodging
reservations, those reservations must be taken at the time
when a state becomes a party to a treaty.137 Because the CERD
already has 182 State Parties,138 none of those existing State
Parties are able to take a reservation. As a result, only a dozen
or so states could even take the recommended reservation to
Article 4 upon joining the treaty.139
While new State Parties taking a reservation to CERD
Article 4 would have the benefit of meaning that they refuse to
take on a treaty obligation to ban speech, it is unclear how
helpful a series of such reservations would be with respect to
the state of international law on mandatory racist hate speech
bans. Reservations that decry or commemorate the broadness
of CERD Article 4 would have the (unintended) consequence of
bolstering existing State Parties claims that they have
expansive rights to ban speech under this provision.140 It may
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that State.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art.
2(1)(d), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT].
137. See CERD, supra note 25, at art. 20(1) (“The Secretary-General of
the United Nations shall receive and circulate to all States which are or may
become Parties to this Convention reservations made by States at the time of
ratification or accession.”) (emphasis added). This timing requirement is
consistent with the definition of a “reservation” in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. See VCLT, supra note 136, at art. 2(1)(d) (stating that a
reservation is made at the time when a State is “signing, ratifying, accepting,
approving, or acceding to a treaty”).
138. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial
Discrimination,
UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
https://perma.cc/Y4CM-L67X (last visited Dec. 29, 2019) (listing the
countries that are state parties to the CERD) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
139. The UN member states that have not yet become State Parties to
the CERD include Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, North Korea, Kiribati,
Malaysia, Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, South Sudan,
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. See International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 138 (indexing the countries that
have become state parties to the CERD).
140. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 19 n. 78 (noting that one of
the three main ways of interpreting CERD Article 4 is “that the protection of
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therefore be preferable for non-parties to the CERD (if they
have the political will to do so) to issue an “understanding”141
that recognizes that Article 4 is subject to ICCPR Article 19’s
tripartite test, rather than a reservation, when joining the
CERD. This would help solidify and give impetus to a
narrower view of the scope of CERD Article 4, and thus better
achieve the authors’ goal because understandings “can be
important when interpreting the meaning of a treaty since, if
other states do not object or offer alternative ones, the
understandings might be viewed as evidence of the parties’
interpretation of the treaty.”142
The authors’ recommendation on CERD Article 4
concludes by asserting that its breadth “cannot be cured by
interpretation.”143 As analyzed in Part II, rigorous application
of ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test to CERD Article 4
significantly narrows the potential breadth of this article
because governments must prove, inter alia, that any speech
bans are not vague and constitute the least intrusive means to
fight racism, which are both significant hurdles that narrow
appropriate invocations of this article to justify speech bans.144
The UN CERD Committee’s General Recommendation 35
similarly provides that imposition of hate speech bans under
CERD Article 4 must meet the conditions of legality, necessity,

human rights may not be invoked to avoid enacting legislation to give effect to”
this ban on racist hate speech by citing to Karl Josef Partsch, Racial Speech

and Human Rights: Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, in STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 24–25 (Sandra Coliver et
al. eds., 1992)).
141. At the time when a state joins a treaty it can issue an
“understanding,” which “is an interpretative statement that clarifies or
elaborates upon a treaty provision without altering it.” SEAN MURPHY,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (West Acad. 2d ed. 2018).
Understandings are therefore different from “reservations,” which allow
states to exclude or modify treaty obligations. See VCLT, supra note 136, at
art. 2(1)(d), (defining a “reservation” as a unilateral statement made by a
country that “purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain
provisions of the treaty in their application to that State”).
142. MURPHY, supra note 141, at 94.
143. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54.
144. See supra notes 24–71 and accompanying text.
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and proportionality.145 In addition, General Recommendation
35 views incitement as limited to cases in which there is
sufficient intent and an imminent risk or likelihood of harm,
which further gives momentum to the authors’ goal of limiting
the potential breadth of this article.146 Rather than taking the
position that this article cannot be narrowed by interpretation
or promoting reservations that commemorate an undesirable
breadth for this article, why not steal victory (broad speech
protections) from the jaws of potential defeat (CERD Article 4)
by emphasizing and promoting several key interpretations of
the UN CERD Committee in human rights advocacy?
B. ICCPR Article 20
The authors’ second recommendation is for states to “enter
reservations to ICCPR Article 20 to prohibit speech only where
it intentionally incites violence or a criminal offence that is
likely to follow imminently (or is otherwise concretely
identified) as the result of the speech.”147 Because there are
already 173 State Parties to the ICCPR148 and reservations
cannot be lodged after a state joins a treaty, this
recommendation would only apply to those few states that are
not already parties to the treaty.149
This recommendation triggers some of the same concerns
noted above with respect to the proposal to promote
reservations to CERD Article 4. First, it is unclear that ICCPR
non-parties with poor records on human rights (including with
respect to freedom of expression) will join the ICCPR with the
145. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
147. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54.
148. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://perma.cc/CE2N-7J2T (last visited Dec.
29, 2019) (listing the countries that are signatories and state parties to the
ICCPR) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
149. China, Cuba, Comoros, Nauru, Palau, and Saint Lucia have signed,
but not ratified the ICCPR. See id. (indexing the countries that are party to
the ICCPR). Additional UN member states that are not State Parties to the
ICCPR include Bhutan, Brunei, Kiribati, Malaysia, Micronesia, Myanmar,
Oman, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Solomon Islands,
South Sudan, Tuvalu, and the United Arab Emirates. Id.
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proposed reservation. Second, if future parties to the ICCPR
have the political will to speak out on this issue, it would be
more strategic to encourage them to join with
“understandings” that commemorate the substance of the
authors’ suggested interpretation for the reasons articulated in
the prior discussion on CERD Article 4.150 While a series of
reservations could unfortunately help to solidify an
interpretation of Article 20 that permits broad speech bans,
the issuance of “understandings” that commemorate the UN
Human Rights Committee and UN Special Rapporteur’s
interpretations of Articles 19 and 20 would be more productive
because they would indicate support for a more limited scope
for this article.
An understanding, for example, could note that any
restriction imposed under Article 20 must pass Article 19’s
tripartite test, as the UN Human Rights Committee
recommends.151 Such an understanding would build
momentum to limit the potential scope of Article 20.152 As
analyzed previously, it will be difficult for bans on offensive
speech to pass the legality condition as many restrictions will
be vague.153 It will also be very difficult for a government to
prove it does not have any good governance means except a
broad ban on speech to achieve a legitimate objective when the
offensive speech is not linked to violence or other harms in the
near term.154 The understanding could also highlight that
ICCPR Article 20 contains an intent element and requires a
“real and imminent” threat of harm, as the UN Special
Rapporteur
noted.155
Again,
understandings
that
commemorate the substance of the UN human rights
machinery’s recommended interpretations156 would help
150. See supra notes 136–142 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 37–46 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 47–64 and accompanying text.
155. See UN SR 2012 Report, supra note 90, at ¶ 46 (explaining that “the
“intent of the speaker to incite discrimination, hostility or violence” and the
“real and imminent danger of violence resulting from the expression” are key
factors in assessing whether speech incites harms).
156. See supra notes 31–83 and accompanying text.
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achieve the authors’ goal of promoting broad speech
protections. Why not steal victory (broad speech protections)
from the jaws of potential defeat (ICCPR Article 20) by
emphasizing
the
UN
machinery’s
recommended
interpretations and promoting widespread acceptance and
implementation of these existing interpretations?
C. “Vague” and “Anachronistic” Reasons for Governmental
Speech Restrictions
The authors express concerns that terms such as “public
morals” in ICCPR Article 19(3) and “propaganda for war” in
ICCPR Article 20 are vague and “should not be relied on to
justify the criminalization of insults.”157 They recommend such
terms “should be defined more precisely” or “states should
enter reservations or declarations in respect of these terms.”158
If the “defining” of these terms implicates re-negotiating the
ICCPR text to include definitions, such a course of action is
likely to result in a roll-back for freedom of expression rather
than a narrowing of these terms for the reasons discussed
above.159 The lodging of reservations by future ICCPR State
Parties would also likely backfire as reservations lamenting
the breadth of these terms would give momentum to existing
State Parties’ claims about the broad scope of governmental
prerogatives under Article 20.160
Issuance of understandings or, as the authors suggest,
“declarations”161 would be preferable to a reservation, as
previously discussed.162 Such understandings or declarations
157. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54. ICCPR Article 19(3) lists
“public morals” as one of the reasons that governments can invoke to restrict
speech. See ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 19(3) (“The exercise of the
rights . . . may therefore be subject to certain restrictions . . . [f]or the
protection of . . . public . . . morals.”); see also id. art. 20(1) (“Any propaganda
for war shall be prohibited by law.”).
158. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54.
159. See supra notes 131–134 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text.
161. MURPHY, supra note 141, at 94 (“A declaration is a statement
expressing the state’s position or opinion on matters relating [to] the treaty,
such as whether to accept an optional form of binding dispute resolution.”).
162. See supra notes 136–142 and accompanying text.
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could cite to the substance of existing UN human rights
machinery definitions of these terms that have sought to limit
their scope. For example, the UN Human Rights Committee
sought to narrow the potential discretion of governments when
they seek to justify speech bans based on “public morals” when
it took the position that “‘the purpose of protecting public
morals must be based on principles not deriving exclusively
from a single tradition. Any such limitations must be
understood in the light of universality of human rights and the
principle of non-discrimination.”163 Referring to such
interpretations in future understandings or declarations could
give additional momentum to a restrictive scope to the grounds
set forth in the “legitimacy” prong of ICCPR Article 19.164
D. The Rights of Others
The authors’ last recommendation at the international
level is that ECHR Article 17165 and ICCPR Article 5166 “should
not apply to freedom of expression cases, which should always
be subject to a balancing test under Articles 10 and 19 of these
conventions, respectively.”167 ECHR Article 17 and ICCPR
163. GC 34, supra note 35, at ¶ 32.
164. See supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text.
165. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 101,
at art. 17
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent
than is provided for in the Convention.
166. See ICCPR, supra note 24, at art. 5
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a
greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant. 2.
There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the
fundamental human rights recognized or existing in any State
Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions,
regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant
does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a
lesser extent.
167. Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 54.
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Article 5 provide that the respective treaties do not authorize
activities or acts aimed at destroying the rights in the
treaty.168 As the authors note, the European Court of Human
Rights has interpreted ECHR Article 17 to mean that certain
types of highly offensive speech are outside of the scope of the
ECHR and thus do not enjoy protection under Article 10.169
The authors also highlight that, although ICCPR Article 5 is
analogous to ECHR Article 17, the UN Human Rights
Committee applies Article 19’s tripartite test to all freedom of
expression cases.170
While I fully agree with the authors that ECHR Article 17
and ICCPR Article 5 should not be applied in a fashion that
prevents application of their respective convention’s speech
protections, this problem exists solely within Europe’s regional
human rights system and not in the international system.
Though it is of course important to remain vigilant that such a
concept not migrate from the regional ECHR jurisprudence
into the international human rights system, it is unclear that
any action is needed with respect to the international system
on this topic. It is also important for human rights advocates
and scholars to encourage the European Court of Human
Rights to cease its guillotine-like application of Article 17 and
instead assess the validity of all restrictions on speech.171
Again,
acknowledging
and
promoting
the
existing
interpretations and practices at the UN level on this topic and
advocating changes to the regional system is preferable to
implying that European interpretations of European regional

168. See supra notes 165–166 and accompanying text.
169. See Clooney & Webb, supra note 14, at 22
Article 17 has been interpreted [by the European Court of Human
Rights] to mean that speech which is so odious that it could not
possibly be protected under Article 10 of the Convention can be
dealt with under Article 17, which allows a case to be struck out
without examination of the merits.
170. See id. at 22 n.92 (“Article 5 of the ICCPR is analogous to Article 17
of the ECHR, but the Human Rights Committee has not used it to strike out
cases without considering the merits under Article 19 or 20 of the ICCPR.”).
171. See id. at 22 (explaining how ECHR Article 17 functions as a
guillotine-like “provision because it does not involve any balancing of the
right to free expression against the other values protected in Article 10”).
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human rights instruments create problems within the UN’s
international human rights system.
E. Reflections on Ways Forward to Promote Free Expression
Given that “the tide around the world is turning against
free speech,”172 seeking to re-negotiate or amend these treaties
to promote broad speech protections at the international level
is inadvisable because governments would likely develop
treaty text that undermines existing international speech
protections. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation’s attempt
to develop a protocol to the CERD that would have
criminalized the “defamation of religions” concept was a recent
case study in which such a scenario almost played out.173 Even
European governments have sought to diminish speech
protections in the international system by invoking the
European Court of Human Rights’ jurisprudence when
defending their domestic laws before the UN’s machinery.174
It is also inadvisable to encourage states to take
reservations that lament and commemorate broad
interpretations of the mandatory bans on speech that exist in
the ICCPR and CERD. Instead, states that join these treaties
should be encouraged to issue understandings upon
ratification that reinforce the substance of the UN human
rights machinery’s recent interpretations, including those that
apply ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test to mandatory speech
bans and otherwise limit the potential scope of ICCPR Article
20 and CERD Article 4. Such understandings could propel
more restrictive interpretations of ICCPR Article 20 and
CERD Article 4 rather than fueling broader readings of these
provisions.175
That said, it is unclear if the small number of countries
that have not yet joined these treaties would do so with
understandings that promote freedom of expression.176 An
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 55.
See supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A–II.B.
See supra notes 138–149 and accompanying text.
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important avenue for human rights advocacy therefore is to
encourage and promote the UN human rights machinery’s
most recent interpretations in a variety of ways.177 For
example, human rights advocates should be vigilant to make
sure there is not backsliding on these interpretations by the
UN human rights machinery, which is constantly under
governmental pressure to expand the scope of acceptable
speech restrictions.178 Advocates should engage with the treaty
bodies and the UN Special Rapporteur on the range of their
work (e.g., reviewing states’ human rights records, considering
individual complaints, and issuing interpretative guidance)
and continue to reinforce the proper implementation of these
interpretations in the bodies’ ongoing work. If the UN Human
Rights Committee or the UN CERD Committee revisit the
scope of acceptable speech restrictions in future general
comments or recommendations, human rights advocates
should actively participate in those public consultations. In
addition, human rights advocates should carefully monitor and
engage during the selection processes for candidates for the
UN’s treaty monitoring bodies and special rapporteur positions
to ensure that selected persons hold views on speech that align
with the most recent UN guidance. To facilitate the migration
of UN norms on speech to the regional systems, human rights
advocates can highlight UN approaches in advocacy efforts at
the regional level.
In essence, freedom of expression advocates should
actively seek to entrench the victories that have been achieved
both in the text of ICCPR Article 19 and in the most recent
interpretations by the UN human rights machinery. These
177. Such interpretations include those relating to ICCPR Article 19’s
tripartite test, the application of Article 19’s tripartite test to ICCPR Article
20 and CERD Article 4 and the understanding that “incitement” requires
findings of an intent to incite, the likelihood of harm, and the imminence of
that harm. See supra notes 26–73, 80–82 and accompanying text. These
interpretations by the UN’s human rights machinery are reasonable
interpretations of the textual language in the ICCPR and CERD and help to
realize the authors’ vision for broad protections for freedom of expression,
even insulting or offensive speech.
178. See Alberto Cerda Silva, supra note 127 (reporting that there is a
“global assault on freedom of expression” as “governments are stretching the
meaning of what’s permitted” under ICCPR Article 19).
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advocates should pursue an active strategy of stealing victory
(broad speech protections) from the jaws of potential defeat
(ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4) by promoting
consistent application of positive interpretations recommended
by the UN machinery.
IV. Concluding Recommendations
So where does all this leave us with respect to concerns
that anchoring content moderation to international human
rights law risks insufficient protections for speech as well as
confusion because of inconsistent norms? With respect to the
international regime’s scope of coverage for offensive speech,
the ICCPR’s rigorous tripartite test of legality, necessity, and
legitimacy, which applies to all speech restrictions (including
the mandatory bans in ICCPR Article 20 and CERD Article 4),
goes a long way towards accomplishing the authors’ vision of
broad international law protections for freedom of expression.
Many laws that ban such speech will fail because they are
either vague or do not reflect the least intrusive means to
achieve a public interest objective. In many instances,
governments can deploy good governance measures that do not
require banning speech. Indeed, the UN human rights
machinery has explicitly and repeatedly condemned the
practice of restricting speech to protect rulers, religions or
royalty. ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test and recent
recommendations by both UN treaty bodies and the UN
Special Rapporteur179 are extremely helpful in protecting
offensive speech and paving the way to fulfill the authors’
vision for broad speech protections.
What about the concern that this body of international law
is afflicted by unworkable contradictions? Part of the basis of
this concern seems to have been an inappropriate conflation of
the UN’s human rights regime with the various regional
human rights regimes. The international system does provide
different (and often greater) speech protections than the
regional systems, but that does not render the international
system incoherent. It simply means there are different systems
179.

For a summary of such interpretations, see supra Part II.A.
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that interpret different treaties and come out differently in
their interpretations. While this is an unfortunate state of
affairs for a variety of reasons, it does not mean the UN’s
human rights regime is incoherent or riddled with
inconsistencies. To the extent the concern about inconsistency
was based upon cited discrepancies within the UN machinery’s
interpretations, those differences are best attributed to an
evolution in the thinking of UN bodies, which evinces a trend
toward greater speech protections.
Having analyzed the specific arguments in The Right to
Insult in International Law, I continue to believe that the
international human rights regime, particularly ICCPR Article
19, remains a useful resource for private platforms to
incorporate into their content moderation policies. But what
does that mean in practical terms? How can ICCPR Article
19’s tripartite test be translated into a corporate context?
As the UN Special Rapporteur explained in 2018, in order
to avoid infringing on international freedom of expression
rights, platforms would first need to develop speech codes that
do not contain vague bans on speech.180 The UN human rights
machinery has provided ample guidance about what
constitutes a vague speech ban.181 Is it not fair to hold global
platforms, which are the most powerful speech regulators in
the world, to a standard that prohibits them from imposing
vague speech bans?
The platforms would also need to determine whether they
are choosing the “least intrusive” means when imposing speech
restrictions.182 First, the companies would need to assess if
they have means at their disposal to achieve the desired goals
without infringing on speech. In practical terms, they might
180. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶¶ 26, 27 (highlighting
examples of platform speech codes that contain vague phrasing); see also
Aswad, supra note 30, at 46–47 (assessing Twitter’s hate speech rules under
ICCPR Article 19’s vagueness test).
181. See supra Part II.A.1.
182. See UN SR 2018 Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 47 (advocating for
companies to properly explain how they narrowly tailor restrictions on their
platforms and how they choose the least intrusive infringements on speech);
Aswad, supra note 30, at 47–52 (discussing how Article 19’s necessity test
would apply to Twitter’s decision making when assessing hate speech).
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consider whether they can promote digital and media literacy
campaigns, speak out on issues, promote dialogues and
counter-narrative approaches on contentious issues, or make
technical changes to their platforms. If implementing such
“good governance” measures would be insufficient, they would
need to analyze if they are selecting the least intrusive means
for restricting speech on their continuum of options, which
include adding friction to access offensive speech, demoting
speech, geo-blocking, and many more avenues.183 Finally,
companies would need to assess if the selected means is likely
to work or be counterproductive. This trilogy of questions
reflects the due diligence that companies would need to engage
in to assure their speech restrictions are “necessary.” Again, is
it not fair to hold the most powerful speech regulators in
human history to a standard that requires refraining from
infringing on individuals’ speech beyond what is necessary?
The trickiest part of translating ICCPR Article 19’s
tripartite test into a corporate context is the “legitimacy”
prong. Are companies well situated to make public interest
determinations, or would their profit-seeking motives
ultimately undermine such assessments? As I have argued
previously, this prong requires further multi-stakeholder
consultation to develop a way forward.184 It may be that this
prong should be excluded in the corporate context (which
means companies would only be held to the legality and
necessity conditions of the ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test).
Alternatively, companies could be required to articulate which
public interest goals they are pursuing with specificity and
evidence-based arguments, subject to heightened scrutiny
because of their brand management incentives when seeking
to ban content.
183. See Aswad, supra note 30, at 50 (analyzing some of the options
available to platforms to restrict speech, including deleting specific posts but
still allowing the user to utilize the platform and issuing warnings to users
who continuously violate “a company’s speech code”).
184. See id. at 52–57 (“Applying the third prong of Article 19(3)’s
tripartite test raises a number of questions that would benefit from further
conversations by interested stakeholders to assess the contours of what is
feasible and to avoid corporations invoking public interest rationales as
pretexts for revenue-driven decisions.”).
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We are at a liminal moment in which global social media
companies are deciding whether to align their worldwide
speech moderation with international human rights law. This
international regime provides a useful framework and
significant guidance that these companies can deploy in the
content moderation context, particularly with respect to
ICCPR Article 19’s legality and necessity conditions. The
existing international regime that governs freedom of
expression has the benefit of reigning in the vast discretion of
platforms in content moderation through the use of a
principled framework that has the added benefit of legitimacy
rooted in global standards. We should be encouraging
companies to voluntarily align their content moderation
policies with this international regime.
In other words, this is another opportunity to steal victory
(i.e., broad international protections for freedom of expression
for billions) from the jaws of potential defeat (i.e., vague
corporate speech bans that can be imposed without regard to
workable measures that infringe less on expression). So why
not steal victory from the jaws of defeat?

